Sanctions research shows enforcement can alter trade and investment, but it rarely explains how enforcement signals are translated into decisions inside firms. We argue this dynamic depends on how organizations structure managerial attention and distribute regulatory knowledge. Formal compliance systems establish procedures without generating shared understanding, which limits the influence of messages about punishment or penalty mitigation. We examine managerial responses to enforcement information through a preregistered survey experiment with 564 self-identified managers and an exploratory latent class analysis of compliance practices. After receiving a punishment, mitigation, or control message, respondents assessed sanctions risk and reported procedures for a prospective client from Kazakhstan. Neither message significantly changed perceived risk or the likelihood of selecting a thorough background check or no response. Although respondents reported compliance practices, only 39 percent correctly identified Treasury/OFAC as the principal U.S. sanctions authority. Correct identification was associated with a 17.2-percentage-point increase in selecting a thorough background check. Latent classes of thin, formalized, and adaptive compliance differed in scenario responses but not Treasury/OFAC identification. These findings show why sanctions implementation cannot be understood from enforcement pressure or formal compliance structures alone. Implementation depends on how organizations transmit regulatory knowledge and organize its application in commercial decisions.