Economic sanctions increasingly depend on private firms to monitor, interpret, and comply with complex regulatory restrictions. Yet sanctions scholarship has paid limited attention to how firms perceive enforcement risk or why managers invest in costly compliance systems. This article examines how regulatory deterrence and reward expectancy shape corporate sanctions compliance behavior. We argue that enforcement actions operate as informational cues that influence managerial assessments of sanctions risk, risk aversion, and willingness to seek compliance information. While punishment-centered messages should heighten perceived exposure and encourage more conservative behavior, messages emphasizing penalty mitigation for good-faith compliance may also motivate firms to acquire compliance resources by framing self-regulation as both protective and rewarded. We further expect these effects to be stronger among firms operating in sectors with higher histories of sanctions enforcement, where past enforcement precedents appear more relevant. To test these expectations, we use a survey experiment of corporate managers in industries potentially exposed to sanctions risks. Respondents are randomly assigned to receive information emphasizing sanctions penalties, penalties plus mitigation for compliance efforts, or no regulatory message. We then assess effects on perceived risk exposure, client-screening behavior, and information-seeking through both survey responses and behavioral link-tracking. The study contributes to research on sanctions enforcement, firm behavior, and regulatory compliance by providing micro-level evidence on how firms internalize geopolitical and regulatory risk.